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I use household survey data to microsimulate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis 
on income distribution in Spain. I estimate the cost of potential lockdowns under 
three different low-income public protection schemes. Results show that although 
the COVID-19 shock has reduced income for all deciles of the income distribu-
tion, the losses are not uniformly distributed. The worst economic effects of the 
pandemic are not on the poorest, but on individuals in the middle and wealthy 
groups of the ex-ante income distribution. Low-income benefits help to moderate 
income losses and to curb poverty and inequality at various levels. It might be 
necessary to raise taxes and to resort to expenditure reducing policies to maintain 
protection in the context of contraction and lower government revenues.
Keywords: fiscal incidence, inequality, poverty, social spending, COVID, Spain
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the effects of low-income benefits on income distribution, 
inequality, and poverty in the context of a deep economic contraction. Worldwide, 
gross domestic product (GDP) experienced a 3.3% fall in 2020. Advanced coun-
tries suffered a more profound recession than developing economies; GDP fell 
4.7% for the former, and 2.2% for the latter. Within the group of advanced econo-
mies, Spain is the country with the deepest GDP fall: 10.8%. Under these unprec-
edented circumstances, consequences on income, inequality and poverty must be 
explored, and policies designed to alleviate the social effects tested. 
Spain is a country with a relatively generous welfare state. Social spending 
accounts for almost 25% of its GDP, well above the average for OECD countries 
(20.4%). However, according to Ayala and Cantó (2020), in the last few years 
“inequality has shown some reluctance to fall, which indicates that it possesses a 
significant structural component’’. The two reasons behind this apparent paradox 
are the inefficient adjustment mechanisms of its labor market and the low redistri-
bution capacity of fiscal interventions. These unique conditions are used to tackle 
the research question in this paper from the perspective of the Spanish case, but 
with the goal of drawing general lessons for advanced countries. 
Figure 11 shows the relationship between social expenditure and the Gini Index. 
The size of the dots corresponds with the percentage of the population living 
under the national poverty line (60% of median income). Data shows that Spain is 
a country with a relatively high social spending to GDP ratio and a relatively low 
redistribution capacity. The Gini Index for disposable income is 0.33 (OECD 
average is 0.31) and the poverty rate using the national poverty line is 14.2% 
(OECD average is 11.6%).
1 I have excluded Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico for representation purposes. Their figures, as well as those 












































































519I microsimulate the impact of different income contractions, mainly using data 
from Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, (ECV). I complement ECV data with 
other surveys, like Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF), and with infor-
mation from fiscal-administrative sources. I construct all the income concepts 
contained in this article following Lustig (2013) approach. 
Figure 1



























Note: OECD countries. 2019 or latest year with available data. 
Source: OECD statistics.  
Surveys like the ECV are produced almost globally on a yearly basis. Information 
provided by them offers a two-year delay from the moment in which the data were 
collected. This means that, to evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis and of 
the different policies in effect, researchers and policymakers would need to wait 
until the moment in which data for the years 2020 and 2021 are published. 
In this paper, I estimate different income contraction scenarios derived from lock-
downs and their aftermaths in Spain. Spain is one of the countries most affected 
by the COVID pandemic (Pollán et al., 2020). Scenarios are simulated under three 
different low-income protection schemes. The first one acts as a benchmark since 
it does not include any specific low-income benefit. Throughout the article, I will 
refer to it as the NLIB (Not Low-Income Benefit) scheme. It considers all other 
transfers and subsidies in effect.
The second one includes a direct means-tested transfer from regional govern-
ments to households fulfilling each region’s conditions (household size, health 
issues...). This protection scheme, also known in Spain as Renta Mínima de Inser-












































































520 simulate a national-wide means-tested program with the same conditions and 
regulation for all regions. This scheme is known as Ingreso Mínimo Vital (IMV) 
(BOE, 2020). It was established as a replacement for RMI from 2020 onward. 
Details on both schemes are provided in section 3.
The contribution of this article to the existing literature is twofold. First, I estimate 
the impact of the COVID crisis and its aftermath for the entire income distribu-
tion, and not only on aggregate or proportionally as is usual in the literature, using 
income and not spending data, as in Aspachs et al. (2020). Second, I provide an 
analysis of the protection provided by low-income benefits beyond the already 
existing articles on hypothetical Universal Basic Income (UBI) designs. My work 
also sheds light on the optimal design of low-income benefits under these extraor-
dinary circumstances. 
This article is structured as follows. In section 2, I present the theoretical frame-
work and the literature review of fiscal incidence and of the COVID-19 impact on 
income distribution in Spain. Section 3 briefly summarizes the data and the meth-
odology used to answer the research question. Section 4 shows the main results 
that I have obtained, and, in section 5, I discuss them and offer some policy rec-
ommendations. Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions of the article.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Fiscal incidence analysis is rooted in the field of public finance. Literature on this 
topic analyzes and measures the distributional impact of a country’s taxes and 
public spending. Tax incidence literature was initially focused on the US tax sys-
tem. Musgrave et al. (1951), Musgrave (1959), Musgrave, Case and Leonard 
(1974), and Pechman (1985) were the main contributors to this research line pro-
viding the first estimations of the distributional effects of the US tax system. On 
the expenditure side, early studies on its incidence can be found in Keid (1954) 
and in the work of the Tax Foundation (1967).
Fiscal incidence analysis consists of allocating taxes and public spending to 
households or individuals in order to compare incomes before taxes and transfers 
with incomes after taxes, transfers, and subsidies (Förster and Whiteford, 2009; 
Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). This allocation process is done through differ-
ent methodological strategies, although microsimulations from survey-based data 
are the most to be found in the literature (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006; Lustig, 
Pessino and Scott, 2014; del Valle Navas and de la Cruz, 2018).
Fiscal redistribution is the process by which the state collects revenues from indi-
viduals and households (primarily through taxes) and spends these revenues on 
benefits (for example, cash transfers, price subsidies, and in-kind benefits such as 
education and health) intended for specific individuals and households (Lustig, 
Pessino nad Scott, 2014). The state modifies post-fiscal income for households 












































































521As Lambert (1992) shows, “the redistributive effect of the net fiscal system is 
equal to the weighted sum of the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers, where 
the redistributive effect of the tax system is defined as the difference between 
inequality of post-tax and Market Income”; income distribution changes before 
and after public interventions. 
Equation 1 summarizes this process.
 Yh = Ih – ΣiTi Sih + ΣjBj Sjh (1)
Where:
Yh = post-fiscal household income.
Ih = pre-fiscal household income.
Ti = total taxes levied on households.
Sih = share of tax i paid by unit h. 
Bj = total transfers to households. 
Sjh = share of transfer j received by unit h.
The so-called accounting approach dominates the literature on fiscal incidence. It 
considers what is paid and received without assessing the behavioral responses 
that taxes and public spending may trigger. This methodology starts from an 
income concept and depending on the fiscal intervention under study, allocates the 
proper amount of a tax or a transfer to each household or individual.
Given the nature of the research question addressed in this article, I will consider 
only the transfer element of equation 1. In particular, I will focus on the effect of 
low-income benefits on inequality and poverty rates during and in the aftermath of 
the COVID-19 crisis, as stated above. 
All income concepts in this article have been produced using the methodology orig-
inally developed in Lustig (2018) and in Gómez-Bengoechea and Quan (2019), for 
the Spanish case. The analysis contained in this article is focused on gross income, 
which is the result of adding contributory pensions and direct transfers to market 
income minus the contributions to the social security for retirement pensions. 
For the case of Spain, research estimates either the impact of COVID-19 on 
income, assuming that income losses are proportional across the entire distribu-
tion (Lustig and Pabon, 2020), or the particular case of a city or region, which is 
too narrow from the geographical point of view. An example of the former can be 
found in Clark, D’Ambrosio and Lepinteur (2020), where authors find that rela-
tive inequality increased, decreased, and grew again in a hump-shaped way in 
2020 for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. The latter can be found in 
Baena-Díez et al. (2020), who show that income reductions have affected the most 












































































522 Existing aggregate results for Spain are consistent with those found globally (Han, 
Meyer and Sullivan, 2020; Deaton, 2021). Both papers find that per capita incomes 
fell more in higher-income countries than in developing nations, even if the for-
mer had better protection schemes. The uneven impact of health crises in each 
region seems to be behind this counter-intuitive result.
An exception to those approaches can be found in Aspachs et al. (2020), which 
shows that public transfers and unemployment insurance schemes have been very 
effective at providing a safety net for the most affected segments of the population 
and at offsetting most of the increase in inequality. They show that in the absence 
of government intervention, spending inequality would have increased dramati-
cally. In section 4, I will confirm those results and will separate the part of that 
safety net that can be attributed to low-income benefits.
From the income protection point of view, research on COVID’s impact has been 
primarily focused hypothetical UBI strategies as a response to the crisis. That is 
the case for Johnson et al. (2020) and Johnson and Roberto (2020), which docu-
ment how UBI may be suited to address these challenges as opposed to, or in 
conjunction with, other relief measures. For the pre-COVID period, there is a 
huge literature analyzing the role of both RMI and IMV in addressing income 
inequalities (Ayala et al., 2021; Aguilar-Hendrickson and Arriba González de 
Durana, 2020; Hernández, Picos and Riscado, 2020).
A low-income benefit is different from a universal basic income (UBI; beneficiar-
ies of the former often face eligibility conditions, while the latter is granted for all 
citizens regardless of their wealth or family situation. The concept of a universal 
basic income (UBI), an unconditional flat-rate transfer paid to everyone, is rooted 
in the literature (Widerquist, 2013) and in the public debate. Policymakers 
(Horvarth and Wignaraja, 2020) support its use as a response to the magnitude of 
and the vulnerability generated by the COVID-19 crisis.
As has been already mentioned, this article contributes to the existing literature by 
providing income contraction results for the entire distribution and not only from a 
proportional or aggregate perspective. Furthermore, I provide an analysis of low- 
income benefits that goes beyond the already existing UBI analyses and suggest some 
policy alternatives that could be explored to enhance current protection mechanisms.
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
I use microdata from the ECV Survey (2018) to build the main income concepts 
necessary to estimate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on poverty and inequal-
ity. ECV is an income-based survey. It gathers information from almost 35,000 
individuals and 13,000 households and offers data both nationally and regionally. 
It does not include consumption-related questions. Regarding household data, it 
offers information on the composition, income, social exclusion and material 












































































523to individuals, ECV contains information on education, health, labor conditions, 
income and material needs. 
Microsimulations allow us to relax the equal loss assumption for the entire popu-
lation often found in the literature. I use techniques analogous to non-anonymous 
growth incidence curves (Bourguignon, 2011) to describe income losses across 
the ex-ante income distribution and to incorporate distributional changes into the 
analysis.
I use gross income per capita as the benchmark income indicator (Lustig et al., 
2020). Gross income is obtained as the aggregate of labor income, capital income, 
other household transfers, contributory pensions and direct public transfers. Direct 
public transfers include unemployment benefits, non-contributory pensions, 
national and regional family-related transfers, and the low-income benefit: RMI or 
IMV; alternatively. I update gross incomes for Spain using the growth rate of per 
capita GDP for 2019 multiplied by a so-called “pass through” of 0.85. Ravallion 
(2003) and Lakner et al. (2019) recommend the use of this pass through to convert 
GDP changes into household disposable incomes variations.
Income losses are obtained by simulating potential impacts at the household level. 
I first identify individuals whose income is at risk because they work in sectors in 
which lockdowns have severely reduced activity. Second, I aggregate at-risk 
income to the household level and then simulate actual loses using a range of two 
parameters: the share of households with at-risk income that actually lose income, 
and the share of income lost for them. Both parameters vary from zero to one 
hundred percent.
The incomes of individuals are considered to be safe or at risk depending on the 
economic sector in which they work. I assume that income derived from work in 
sectors that are “essential” are not at risk. I use the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) definition of essential sectors (public services, health care and social 
services).
Following these criteria, I consider an economic sector to be at-risk if the aggre-
gate variation of compensations paid to individuals fell more than the aggregate 
for all sectors (14.35%) between March and April 2020, when the lockdown was 
more strict in Spain, according to the Spanish Tax Office. Table 1 shows the aggre-
gate variation in compensations by economic sector2.
2 Economic Sectors follow the classification of the Spanish Tax Office, while workers are categorized accord-
ing to ILO rules. As a consequence, some regrouping is necessary to merge information. Complementary Pro-
fessional Activities include logistics, telecommunications and other supporting services. Industrial Production 













































































Aggregate variation in total compensations March-April 2020 by economic sector 
(in percent)
Economic sector Aggregate variation in total compensations
Agriculture 6.46
Other professional activities -9.60
Industrial production -11.45
Total for all sectors -14.35







Source: Author’s estimations based on Spanish Tax Office statistics.  
Exposed economic sectors are the following: manufacturing, construction, retail, 
hospitality, financial services, real-estate sector, education, and arts and recrea-
tion. Agriculture, industrial production (other than manufacturing: extracting 
industries, energy, and water supply...) and the so-called complementary profes-
sional activities (such as logistics, information and telecommunications...) are 
safe economic sectors, following this identification strategy.
The impact on income derived from this categorization and from the subsequent 
simulations is analyzed under three different low-income protection schemes. In 
the first protection scheme (Non Low-Income Benefit, NLIB), I consider gross 
income without any additional low-income protection transfer. That includes mar-
ket income plus pensions and direct transfers (unemployment benefits, national 
family benefits, regional family benefits, non-contributory pensions and regulari-
zation from personal income taxes). 
Renta Mínima de Inserción (RMI) scheme includes all the transfers in the NLIB 
simulation, as well as the regional minimum income protection operating in Spain 
until the year 2020. RMI is a non-contributory transfer for residents between 25 
and 65 years with no sufficient income. It is managed at the regional level and 
amounts, duration and conditions for elegibility vary across territories. For exam-
ple, in Andalusia, Madrid or Valencia benefit was established as the 70% of the 
legal minimum wage, while in Murcia or Castilla y León it was 70% of the bench-
mark indicator used by the Spanish administration for the allocation of all other 













































































525In the IMV scenario I substitute RMI for the newly approved, and still in its early 
operating phase, low-income state benefit. IMV centralizes the management of the 
transfer and establishes the same conditions and rules for the whole country, with 
no regard for households’ regions. Its regulation is very similar to the RMI in 
terms of eligibility, but the duration and the amount of the benefits are higher in 
almost all cases. 
Conditions for the identification of IMV beneficiaries are also means-tested. They 
include other limitations, such as age (between 23 and 65 years old), residence, 
household size and being actively looking for a job. There are some exceptions to 
these conditions due to reasons of social concern, such as being a victim of a sex 
crime or of gender-based violence. 
Income limits and the amount of the benefit vary depending on the size and com-
position of each household. For a one-individual household, the benefit amount 
would be 5,538 euros, for incomes below 16,614 euros per year. For a two adults 
and one child household, the benefit amount would rise to 8,861 euros, for those 
incomes below 29,905 euros per year. Table A2 in the appendix section shows the 
benefit amounts for the national IMV and for the regional RMI schemes.
4 RESULTS
In this section, I present the composition of pre-crisis incomes and the impact of 
the COVID-19 economic shock on poverty, inequality, and the distribution of 
post-crisis income under the different low-income protection schemes.
4.1 COMPOSITION OF PRE-CRISIS INCOME
Figure 2 shows the composition of pre-crisis incomes across the entire distribution 
for each protection scheme. Income distribution is obtained from the original data 
in the ECV survey. I consider 5 income categories: public transfers, contributory 
pensions, government salaries (the three of them are public sector related), “safe” 
labor income and “at risk” labor income.
Data for the three protection schemes show the important role that public transfers 
play for the first deciles of the income distribution; they represent as much as 80% 
of the total income distribution for decile 1. The public sector, through transfers, 
contributory pensions, and salaries, generates around 30% of total income for 
deciles 2 to 8. 
At-risk income represents around 40% of total income for deciles 3 to 10. Safe 
income behaves in a similar way, but it grows significantly for the first and last 
deciles. Initial deciles include incomes derived from essential low-skilled jobs, 
like agriculture or logistics (see table A3 in the appendix section for further details 
on each decile composition by individuals in each economic sector). The final 
deciles group workers whose income comes from positions in which remote 
working is more feasible (financial sector, for example) and with an available at-













































































Income composition under different protection schemes
(a) NLIB scenario
Deciles of gross income  























Deciles of gross income  
Transfers Pensions Government salaries Safe income At-risk income






















Deciles of gross income  
Transfers Pensions Government salaries Safe income At-risk income

































































































527The impact of RMI and IMV can be appreciated in deciles from 0 to 3 where there 
is a higher concentration of public transfers in comparison with NLIB. For the 
IMV scheme, public transfers represent a higher percentage of income than for 
RMI. Transfers fall below 20% of total income after deciles 2, 4 and 6 in the 
NLIB, RMI and IMV simulations.
4.2 STRESSING INCOMES
To simulate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on household income and the 
resulting evolution of inequality, poverty and minimum income guarantee schemes 
I stress at-risk incomes following Lustig et al. (2020). Table 2 shows the range of 
possible income losses when I increase the share of households that lose their at-
risk income and the share of income lost for those households.
Cells in table 2 show the range of possible per capita household gross income 
losses (as a proportion of ex ante gross income) as we vary both the probability 
that households lose at-risk income (down the rows) and the share of that at-risk 
income they lose (across the columns). I vary both parameters from 0 to 100%. 
The possible outcomes represent the variation of total per capita income; they 
range from near zero to almost 15% of pre-crisis income. 
For example, the 10%-10% cell of this matrix shows the fall in income corresponding 
to the case in which 10% of the households (with at risk income) lose 10% of their 
income each; that cell corresponds with a 0.2% decrease in per capita gross income.
Table 2
Scenarios for income losses as a percentage of total household income 
% of at-risk income lost




















10 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 
20 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0 
30 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.2 4.7 
40 0.6 1.2 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.7 4.3 4.9 5.6 6.2 
50 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.1 3.9 4.6 5.4 6.2 6.9 7.7 
60 0.9 1.8 2.8 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.4 7.4 8.3 9.2 
70 1.1 2.1 3.2 4.3 5.3 6.4 7.5 8.5 9.6 10.7 
80 1.2 2.4 3.6 4.8 6.0 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12.0 
90 1.3 2.7 4.0 5.4 6.7 8.1 9.4 10.7 12.1 13.4 
100 1.5 3.0 4.4 5.9 7.4 8.9 10.4 11.8 13.3 14.8 
Source: Author’s estimations based on ECV data.
I narrow the focus of the article on those cells that have income losses similar to 
Spain’s GDP contraction in the year 2020 (-10.8%). I have highlighted them in 
table 2. They form an “iso-loss” curve that runs diagonally through the table. I 
choose the two results where either the smallest proportion of households lose 












































































528 with at-risk income), or the largest proportion of households lose smaller amounts 
of income (lower left, 80% of at-risk income lost for 90% of the households with 
at-risk income). 
I will refer to them as the “concentrated” and “dispersed” losses scenarios. My 
analysis is focused on those two scenarios for the three different protection 
schemes already explained. The matrix in table 3 summarizes the contraction sce-
narios and protection schemes under which I present the results in this section.
Table 3
Low-income protection schemes and income contraction scenarios 
 Income contraction scenarios
Low-income 
protection schemes
Concentrated losses under NLIB Dispersed losses under NLIB
Concentrated losses under RMI Dispersed losses under RMI
Concentrated losses under IMV Dispersed losses under IMV
4.3 IMPACT ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
Tables 4 and 5 show the incidence on poverty of concentrated and dispersed losses 
scenarios using four poverty thresholds: the US $1.9, $3.2 and $5.5 a day interna-
tional poverty lines (in 2011 purchasing power parity), as well as for the national 
poverty rate. National poverty rate line is defined as the percentage individuals 
living below 60% of the median income. I test the evolution of those magnitudes 
both for the concentrated and dispersed losses scenarios under the three aforemen-
tioned protection mechanisms.
Table 4
Concentrated losses scenarios, incidence on different poverty lines (percentage of 
population living under each line)
Concentrated losses (90-80)
NUBI Pre-COVID Post-COVID Change New poor
1.9 $ / day 0.75 0.89 0.14 67,682
3.2 $ / day 0.80 1.01 0.21 101,286
5.5 $ / day 0.86 1.19 0.34 159,502
National poverty line 6.70 8.06 1.36 643,688
RMI Pre-COVID Post-COVID Change New poor
1.9 $ / day 0.43 0.56 0.13 61,529
3.2 $ / day 0.46 0.65 0.19 88,507
5.5 $ / day 0.48 0.80 0.32 152,876
National poverty line 6.49 8.01 1.52 719,416
RMV
1.9 $ / day 0.45 0.53 0.08 37,391
3.2 $ / day 0.49 0.58 0.09 42,124
5.5 $ / day 0.51 0.67 0.16 74,781
National poverty line 6.18 7.69 1.51 716,103













































































Dispersed losses scenarios, incidence on different poverty lines (percentage of 
population living under each line)
Dispersed losses (80-90)
NUBI Pre-COVID Post-COVID Change New poor
1.9 $ / day 0.75 0.85 0.10 48,750
3.2 $ / day 0.80 0.93 0.13 59,162
5.5 $ / day 0.86 1.02 0.16 74,781
National poverty line 6.70 8.13 1.43 678,712
RMI
1.9 $ / day 0.43 0.53 0.11 50,643
3.2 $ / day 0.46 0.58 0.12 58,689
5.5 $ / day 0.48 0.64 0.16 77,621
National poverty line 6.49 8.08 1.59 753,493
RMV
1.9 $ / day 0.45 0.50 0.05 22,245
3.2 $ / day 0.49 0.55 0.06 29,345
5.5 $ / day 0.51 0.58 0.08 35,497
National poverty line 6.18 7.76 1.58 747,814
Source: Author’s estimations based on ECV data.   
Absolute poverty rates are higher for concentrated than for dispersed losses under 
the three protection schemes. For the RMI scheme, poverty rates range from 
0.56% of the population for the $1.9 a day line to 0.8% at $5.5 a day. For dispersed 
losses, those same rates are 0.53% and 0.67%. Similar patterns can be observed 
for the NLIB and IMV cases, with higher poverty rates for the concentrated losses 
scenario. Poverty rates under the national poverty line show a similar behavior for 
concentrated and dispersed losses scenarios. 
RMI and IMV reduce poverty significantly compared to the absence of any mini-
mum income guarantee scheme. For the RMI scheme under the concentrated 
losses simulation, the number of new poor individuals would be 61,529 for the 
$1.9 line. There would be 37,391 new individuals falling behind that same poverty 
line under the IMV scheme. 
IMV shows a better performance than RMI under all simulations. This suggests that 
the changes in eligibility conditions and amounts generated by the centralization of 
the benefit improve aggregate results. Poverty increase is lower without any protec-
tion than under the RMI scheme for the national poverty line, as well. This counter-
intuitive result can be explained by the fact that many households may not get access 
to the benefit due to non-income related conditions (potential beneficiaries must 
prove they have applied and been rejected for all possible benefits before asking for 
IMV or RMI) or do not even apply for it, due to the disincentives generated by the 
bureaucratic costs attached to the whole process (Ayala et al., 2021; Natili, 2018) or 












































































530 Inequality, measured through the Gini Index, shows a better performance under 
IMV than under RMI for the three protection schemes. Table 6 shows that Gini 
Index rises from 0.45 before the COVID-19 shock to 0.51 under RMI, for concen-
trated losses, and to 0.493, for dispersed losses. For the IMV protection, Gini 
varies from 0.434 to 0.494 in the concentrated losses and to 0.477 for dispersed 
losses simulation, before and after the income shock. 
Inequality is much higher under NLIB simulations. Gini Index would rise from 
0.498 for pre-crisis income to 0.550-0.567 for the dispersed or concentrated losses 
post-crisis scenarios. These results are consistent with (Gomez-Bengoechea and 
Quan, 2019) for gross income, which coincide with those found by (del Valle 
Navas and de la Cruz, 2018) as well. Different methodological approaches make 
direct comparison with other available estimations non-informative. Further 
results on the Gini Index evolution under the different income-stress simulations 
can be found in figure 4 in the appendix section. 
Table 6
Gini Index for concentrated and dispersed losses under different protection 
schemes
Concentrated losses
 Ex ante Ex post % change
NUBI 0.498 0.567 13.9
RMI 0.450 0.510 13.3
RMV 0.434 0.494 13.9
Dispersed losses
NUBI 0.498 0.550 10.5
RMI 0.450 0.493 9.6
RMV 0.434 0.477 10.0
Source: Authors’ estimations based on ECV data.   
4.4  IMPACT ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Figure 3 shows income evolution for each decile of the income distribution rela-
tive to gross income. Four big conclusions can be derived from it. The first one is 
that all individuals are worse off after the impact of the crisis for every decile, 
even if losses are not uniformly distributed through the entire distribution.
The second one is that income losses are much larger under the concentrated 
losses scenario. Income evolution captured in figure 3(a) shows that there is a 
group of individuals below decile 1 that do not get any benefit for different rea-
sons, as already mentioned. For them, losses range from 15% to 40% on the three 
low-income protection schemes. 
Around decile 1, income losses recover to 10% thanks to the role of public trans-
fers and other social measures to alleviate income losses. Largest income falls can 












































































531would be between 40% and 20% under the RMI and IMV schemes. In the NLIB 
scenario, income would be reduced by 60% for individuals between decile 2 and 
3. After decile 5, losses would moderate and almost converge beyond decile 9 
under the three protection scenarios. 
Figure 3
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Deciles of gross income
RMV RMI NLIB
Source: Author’s estimations based on ECV data.
The third conclusion is derived from the dispersed losses simulation; income 
reduction is less profound and more evenly distributed. Under the NLIB scheme, 
income falls around 30% from decile 2 to decile 7. This contraction is half of the 
reduction experienced under concentrated losses. Both simulations show a similar 
evolution for the first deciles (0 to 2), but the reduction in losses recovers faster 












































































532 Finally, results show that low-income benefits limit income losses. IMV is more 
effective than RMI but, in both cases, they curb the impact of income losses for 
potential beneficiaries. The relative homogeneity of at-risk and safe incomes for 
the entire distribution and the fact that contributory pensions and salaries earned 
in the public sector are spread along the entire income distribution explain the 
similar decrease in income for middle- and high-income groups. Results show a 
relatively small impact on high-skilled white-collar workers’ that can better adapt 
to lockdowns through online work (Belzunegui-Eraso and Erro-Garcés, 2020), 
and whose income is in deciles 8 and 9 (see table A3 in the appendix).
From the point of view of income mobility between social groups, post-shock 
income evolution offers interesting results as well. Table 7 shows the downward 
mobility of high and middle classes caused by the COVID-19 crisis. Income 
groups are defined as follows: poor individuals are those living below $5.50 per 
day. Middle class captures income between $5.50 and $57.60 per day. High 
income is established above the $57.60 per day threshold. This identification strat-
egy has been established following Lustig et al. (2020) criteria.
Almost 6% of high-income individuals would fall into the middle class in the 
concentrated losses scenario. 2%, 1.2% and 0.8% of individuals would decline 
from middle class to poverty under the three protection schemes considered. For 
dispersed losses, downward mobility is much lower: around 3.5% of individuals 
would move from high to middle income groups, and 1%, 0.6% and 0.4% would 
do it from middle to low income.
Table 7
Income mobility by income group (in percent)
Concentrated losses Dispersed losses
From high  
to middle
From middle  
to poor
From high  
to middle
From middle  
to poor
NUBI 5.7 2.0 3.7 1.0 
RMI 5.9 1.2 3.6 0.6 
IMV 5.9 0.8 3.3 0.4 
Source: Author’s estimations based on ECV data.   
5 DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This article tackles the impact of the COVID crisis on income distribution and the role 
played by low-income benefits to curb inequality and poverty increases. Results con-
tribute to the literature showing how income falls are not evenly distributed along the 
entire distribution and bring lessons that should be taken into account for an optimal 
design of low-income benefits. The first implication derived from the results obtained 
is that higher amounts and a centralized design of benefits could help to lower poverty 
rates and inequality, under certain conditions and with some limitations, as will be 
explained in the following lines. The different simulations have shown that IMV is 












































































533The second one is that higher benefits will not fix the problems for the middle classes 
by themselves. Even if the most affected income groups in the simulations are roughly 
in the middle and higher middle classes (deciles 2 to 7, approximately), the literature 
shows the role played by globalization (Asha, 2018; Milanovic, 2012) and mecha-
nization on the stagnation of labor income in advanced countries; this is a problem 
area that seems to go beyond traditional fiscal policies.
Third, it is necessary to establish mechanisms that can ease and evenly share the 
income adjustments that future crises may bring. Income contraction derived from 
the impact of COVID generates more new poor individuals for the concentrated 
than for the dispersed losses scenario. Inequality shows a similar pattern; the dis-
persed losses scenario shows lower inequality increases. Labor market adjust-
ment, through wages and not necessarily through firms’ downsizing (Kahn, 2012), 
should help in that regard. Remote work programs, when possible, would also 
reduce impacts on income of future crises like the one analyzed in this article, as 
the evolution and composition of incomes for the latest deciles suggests.
Finally, more than 60% of Spanish income depends on the public sector in one 
way or another. The public sector, through transfers, contributory pensions, and 
salaries generates around 40% of total income for deciles 2 to 8. At the same time, 
income composition reveals that at-risk income (thus, potentially in need of public 
help), represents around 30% of total income for deciles 3 to 10. 
The original budget for the IMV program was 2,890 million euros for the year 
2021 (AIREF, 2020). Results suggest an increase of its cost derived from the new 
poor individuals under the national poverty line (which is used as a reference for 
the IMV program) between 24.4% for the concentrated and 25.6% for the dis-
persed losses scenarios. The total cost of the IMV program would rise to 3,628 
million euros for the concentrated losses scenario and to 3,594 million euros for 
the dispersed losses scenario. This extra pressure on public finance, also coming 
from other social programs, may require from tax rises that they maintain low-
income protection policies in a context of weak revenues.
As a consequence of the previous implications, an improvement of the current 
design of low-income benefits in Spain would require, first, the same eligibility 
conditions and minimum benefit amounts at the national level, as in the IMV 
scheme. However, the particularities documented in the literature (see Gómez- 
Bengoechea, 2020; and del Valle Navas and de la Cruz, 2018) suggest the neces-
sity of adapting the conditionality on income thresholds and on the amount of the 
benefit to each region’s circumstances.
Some of the left-behind individuals fall below the means-tested conditions estab-
lished for receiving low-income benefits, but do not get access to it due to bureau-
cratic costs, information barriers and other formal reasons. Without a careful pol-












































































534 critical to make those benefits available for those individuals in need that do not 
receive the benefit (Ayala et al., 2021; Natili, 2018). A simplification of the bureau-
cratic process, the use of municipal agencies by the central government to reach 
potential beneficiaries and the establishment of offices to manage the submission 
and approval of applications for benefits would help in that regard.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The impact of COVID-19 on the whole world has been dramatic, both in terms of 
lives taken and income losses. Countries with a more developed welfare state 
should be able to cope better with this extreme situation through their structural 
and ad-hoc policies.
The case of Spain is a paradigmatic one for the study of this problematic. The recent 
approval of the IMV (a means-tested national transfer paid to lowest incomes) 
allows me to test its role on smoothing the impact of the crisis and its performance 
relative to previously existing RMI (like IMV, but at the regional level) and to the 
hypothetical absence of any minimum income state protection schemes. 
Results show that the worst effects of the COVID-19 crisis and the potential lock-
downs it could still bring are not on the poorest, but those in the middle and 
wealthy groups of the ex-ante income distribution. Under all microsimulations, 
IMV is more efficient in curbing poverty and inequality than RMI. Without any of 
these protection policies, inequality and poverty rates would be higher. 
The paper has some caveats that should be tackled in the upcoming research on 
this topic. First, as has been mentioned, the microsimulations do not take into 
account behavioral responses or general equilibrium effects, so they yield first-
order effects only. Second, the depth and duration of the crisis is still uncertain. 
Third, results depend on the specific assumptions we make about income sources 
that are “at risk” and the extent to which losses are concentrated or dispersed 
across households. Fourth, I am assuming that all individuals fulfilling the condi-
tions to get the benefits are, in fact, receiving them. This is a limitation common 
to this kind of literature. Finally, I focus my analysis at the national level; regional 
and local differences could also be exploited in future articles. 
The challenge for the Spanish state is twofold. First, it needs to fine tune IMV 
performance and design; preliminary government data show that the number of 
recipients is well below initial projections. Second, it may be necessary to raise 
taxes and to reduce expenditure under other policies to maintain protection 
schemes in the context of lower public revenues. Furthermore, low productivity 
and the current demographic dynamic could trigger an austerity debate in the 
aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.
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Gini Index, poverty rates and social spending
Country Gini Index Poverty rates Social spending(% of GDP)
Austria 0.28 9.4 26.9
Belgium 0.26 8.2 28.9
Canada 0.30 11.8 18.0
Chile 0.46 16.5 11.4
Czech Republic 0.25 6.1 19.2
Costa Rica 0.50 19.9 12.2
Denmark 0.26 6.1 28.3
Germany 0.29 10.4 25.9
Estonia 0.31 16.3 17.7
Finland 0.27 6.5 29.1
France 0.30 8.5 31.0
Great Britain 0.37 11.7 20.6
Greece 0.31 12.1 24.0
Hungary 0.29 8.0 18.1
Ireland 0.29 9.0 13.4
Israel 0.25 16.9 16.3
Italy 0.33 13.9 28.2
Latvia 0.34 17.5 16.4
Lithuania 0.36 15.5 16.7
Luxembourg 0.32 11.4 21.6
Mexico 0.42 16.6 7.5
Netherlands 0.29 8.3 16.1
Norway 0.26 8.4 25.3
Poland 0.28 9.8 21.3
Portugal 0.32 10.4 22.6
Slovakia 0.24 7.7 17.7
Slovenia 0.25 7.5 21.1
South Korea 0.35 16.7 12.2
Spain 0.33 14.2 24.7
Sweden 0.28 8.9 25.5
Switzerland 0.30 9.2 16.7
United States 0.39 17.8 18.7
Note: OECD Countries, 2019 or latest year with available data. 













































































Minimum and maximum benefit amounts: RMI regional and IMV national low 
income protection schemes (in €)
Protection scheme and region Min. benefit amount Max. benefit amount
RMI Andalucía 5,287.44 4,541.88 
RMI Aragón 5,892.00 5,892.00 
RMI Asturias 5,315.52 3,455.04 
RMI Baleares 5,178.36 4,140.60 
RMI Canarias 5,745.24 2,267.76 
RMI Cantabria 5,163.24 2,904.36 
RMI Castilla – La Mancha 5,357.40 4,079.76 
RMI Castilla y León 5,168.40 3,221.88 
RMI Cataluña 7,248.00 6,216.00 
RMI Ceuta 3,600.00 1,440.00 
RMI Extremadura 5,163.24 3,549.73 
RMI Galicia 5,084.16 4,067.28 
RMI La Rioja 5,163.24 2,904.36 
RMI Madrid 4,800.00 5,722.20 
RMI Melilla 5,503.68 3,669.12 
RMI Murcia 5,163.24 4,517.88 
RMI Navarra 7,329.60 7,329.60 
RMI Valencia 3,090.84 6,623.04 
RMI País Vasco 7,733.88 4,130.64 
IMV National 5,544.00 6,636.00 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NUBI 10% NUBI 100% RMI 10%
RMI 100% IMV 10% IMV 100%
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Source: Author’s estimations based on ECV data.
